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STILL THEY SAIL
SHIPBUILDING IN TAMPA DURING WORLD WAR II
By LEWIS N. WYNNE, Ph.D.
Executive Director
The Florida Historical Society

ANOTHER SHIP SLIDES DOWN THE WAYS
…USS MAUNA LOA LAUNCHED APRIL 4, 1943
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN COLLECTION

When the planes from Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo’s carriers attacked the American
Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7,
1941, the United States was thrust into the
cauldron of world war.
Subsequent declarations of war by Adolph
Hitler and Benito Mussolini merely
confirmed what the American public already

realized--that they were in a fight for the
very survival of the world as they knew it.
Paper presented by Dr. Lewis N. Wynne
before
Gulf
Coast
History
and
Humanities Conference, University of
South Alabama, Mobile, AL, March 10,
1989.

had demoralized the people of the United
States and had hobbled its industry to the
point that it appeared to be dead, but the
reality of the situation was that American
industry was merely hibernating, awaiting
some stimulus to bring it to life. Pearl
Harbor served that purpose.
Tampa, Florida, like hundreds of other small
cities, had suffered the Depression decade
fitfully. The city's economy had experienced
sputters and sparks of revival, but since its
economy was based primarily on
agricultural or service industries, Tampa
found little in the way of continuous prosperity. Her port, once a bustling hive of
activity, was largely stagnant and
contributed little to prosperity.

ATTY. GEN. J. TOM WATSON
…Pushed 'Right to Work'
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN
COLLECTION

Despite the optimism of some Japanese and
German militarists over the destruction of
the Pacific Fleet, other, wiser leaders were
less enthusiasitic. Fleet Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, the strategic planner of the Pearl
Harbor raid, quieted the jubilant voices on
his staff, noting that only a portion of
American naval strength had been wiped out
and warning darker days ahead for Japan,
since they had only "awakened the sleeping
giant.”1
Yamamoto's depiction of the United States
as a sleeping giant was very apt. The
collapse of the economy in 1929 and the
hardships of the Depression that followed

After the explosive development boom of
the 1920s, Tampa had struggled through the
'30s and experienced only minimal growth.
Its population had grown slowly during the
decade, with only 7,000 new persons
becoming residents of the city. The 6.7%
change in population growth from 1930 to
1940 could easily be accounted for by the
natural increase in a city of that size. For
Tampa's people, the Depression struck hard.
The adjusted unemployment rate for white
males was 10.8%, but that figure almost
doubled when individuals involved in
emergency government employment-the
CCC, WPA and PWA-were counted. For
nonwhites and women, the rate was even
higher. With virtually no manufacturing
base for heavy industry, citizens relied
heavily on the annual influx of tourists to
supplement the local economy.2

LIGHT AT END OF TUNNEL
There were occasional bright spots in the
otherwise
dismal
picture.
Tampa
Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, in

enact this legislation. The purpose of the act
was to fund the construction of ten merchant
ships a year for ten years. For American
shipyards, which had constructed only two
dry cargo vessels between 1922 and 1935,
the Merchant Marine Act was a godsend.
Not only did it provide a market for new
ships, but it also featured a "no lose"
cost-plus incentive for builders and
operators.4

CHRISTENING VESSEL
…Mrs. Jamie Goss, Apr. 20, 1944
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN
COLLECTION

operation since February, 1917, offered
some hope in 1938 when it borrowed
$750,000 from the Public Works
Administration to fund the construction of a
10,000-ton dry dock. The company’s
objective was to compete for shipbuilding
contracts available through the U.S.
Maritime Commission and authorized by the
Merchant Marine Act of
1936.3
The Roosevelt Administration, disturbed by
the inability of American shipyards to
compete with foreign yards and aware that
the clouds of war which had gathered in
Europe and Asia might soon cover the
United States, prevailed upon Congress to

Under the leadership of Ernest Kreher,
Tampa Shipbuilding secured the PWA loan,
constructed the dry dock and, in 1939, was
awarded an $8 million contract for the
construction
of
four
cargo
ships.
Approximately 2,000 new jobs were created,
and for the city’s 6,400 unemployed males,
the company’s success in securing the
contracts seemed like the answer to their
prayers. The excitement created by the
contract award was soon dampened when
the company announced that after the
construction of a single ship, the Seawitch, it
was in serious financial difficulty and might
not be able to fulfill the remaining
contracts.5
The inefficient management of the company
prompted the Maritime Commission and the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which
had assumed the PWA loan, to look around
for new owners. In the words of a U.S.
Accounting Office report in 1942,
"Kreher…and his associates were competent
shipbuilders, [but] they were incapable of
efficiently
managing
the
company's
6
finances.” The heavy demands for ships
generated by the war in Europe and the
realization that the U.S. might soon be
involved made it imperative to find someone
new to oversee the administration of the
company.
Encouraged by the Maritime Commission
and the RFC, a local financier, George B.

happen easily. With the shift from peacetime
production to wartime construction, TASCO
immediately became embroiled in two major
controversies.
NO MISDOING

MAYOR R. E. L. CHANCEY
…Tampa's Wartime Leader.
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN
COLLECTION

Howell of the Exchange National Bank,
purchased the company for $500 and
became the sole owner. Along with the
contracts for three new ships, Howell also
acquired $47,000 in assets and the almost $1
million in liabilities. Under Howell’s
leadership, TASCO, as the new company
was called, worked to fill the contracts with
the Maritime Commission. When war came
in 1941, the new management was in place
and ready to expand to meet the needs of the
nation.7
In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, TASCO
quickly converted its peacetime operations
to a war footing. Within days, the company
began to gear up to meet the anticipated
needs of the Navy and to expand its facilities
to increase the number of bottoms it could
handle at once. Change, however, did not

The first centered around the reorganization
of the company and the purchase of all
outstanding stock by George B. Howell in
1940. When Howell had assumed control,
TASCO had contracts for three cargo
vessels for the Maritime Commission.
Immediately after the U.S.’s entry into the
war, the company had sold these ships, with
the concurrence of the Commission, to the
Navy. The transaction, which gave TASCO
a working capital in excess of $2 million,
came under the scrutiny of the U.S.
Accounting Office. After reviewing the
evidence, the AO charged Howell and
TASCO with illegally selling the ships and
with overcharging the Navy to the tune of
$1.2 million. The controversy dragged on,
but while bureaucrats and company lawyers
argued, the yard continued to build new
ships. Despite the heat surrounding the
transaction, both the Commission and the
Navy supported Howell, and he was
ultimately absolved of any misdoing.8
The second controversy which involved
TASCO and other shipyards in the state
stemmed from the efforts of State Attorney
General J. Tom Watson to have a "closed
shop" contract between the company and the
American Federation of Labor declared
unconstitutional. Watson, a flamboyant attorney, had attempted to persuade the State
Legislature to outlaw the practice in 1941,
but had been unsuccessful. In June, 1942,
Watson, using the war emergency as an
excuse, attacked the union in court. His
pursuit of this cause also included a round of
fisticuffs with M. J. Nicholason, the attorney
for the National Labor Relations Board.

Although the courts gave him a technical
victory and declared the closed shop
suspended during the duration of the
emergency,
the
practice
continued
nevertheless. Watson’s efforts were not
supported publicly by local leaders, and
TASCO remained unionized throughout the
war.9
"WAR WORK" EMPLOYMENT

an inspection of the Tampa yards. Citing a
need for 30,000 additional workers in yards
along the Gulf of Mexico, Woodward
offered the observation that "Women seem
to be the answer, the only one, to the problem."10
Although TASCO remained the largest
single employer in Tampa, its ability to
secure the 16,000 workers it needed by 1943
was hampered by the construction of a
second major shipyard in 1942. Citizens of
the city were delighted with the
announcement in the Tampa Tribune that a
private company intended to spend $30
million to construct a shipyard in Tampa to
produce 24 unique cargo vessels, financed
by a U.S. Maritime Commission contract for
$30 million.11

For Tampans, as for most Americans, the
war provided a welcomed relief to the
economic stagnation of the Depression. For
the next four years, workers of all ages and
occupations were recruited to provide the
manpower needed to produce the materiel
the U.S. and its allies needed. "War work"
and "war industries" became the single
largest employers of laborers, as thousands
of large and small plants sprang into
existence overnight to meet this need. The
12.5 million Americans who had suffered
through the Depression unemployed now
found themselves being actively recruited to
fill factory spaces. Older workers, forced
into retirement during the previous decade,
were now coaxed back to work for wages
that were significantly higher than their
Social Security benefits. TASCO, for
example, employed a number of workers in
their sixties and seventies who possessed
metalworking skills that were considered
essential. High school and college students
were encouraged to contribute to the war
effort by taking part-time jobs.

This project, known as the Hooker’s Point
Yard, was the creation of Matthew H.
McCloskey,
Junior,
a
Philadelphia
construction mogul and a powerful
Democratic politician. Taking advantage of
the national shortage of rolled steel,
McCloskey proposed the use of concrete for
ship construction. Despite the rather
lackluster performance of similar ships
during World War 1, materiel shortages and
the success of German U-boats dictated
improvisation. Within weeks of the contract
award, McCloskey and his staff moved their
operations to Tampa.12

Perhaps the greatest gains in the labor
market were made by women, and
thousands of them took on the roles of
"Rosie, the Riveter" and "Wanda, the
Welder." As the demand for soldiers grew,
women workers became more and more
essential. Thomas M. Woodward, a member
of the U.S. Maritime Commission, noted the
importance of women in the labor force on

Hooker’s Point was little more than a sandy
spit of land jutting into Tampa Bay. For
McCloskey, however, the site had three
major advantages. First, it was located
adjacent to the ship channel in the harbor.
Second, its nearest neighbor was the Florida
Portland Cement Company, with a fleet of
trucks to haul wet concrete. Third, as
McCloskey explained to the local

CONCRETE SHIPS

newspaper, "You’ve got to get away from
frost to pour concrete, and we…can work
the year around.”13
Before work on the ships could begin, the
yard had to be constructed from the ground
up. Administrative buildings, lofts for
creating forms and patterns, machine shops,
utility services, service roads and storage
sheds were necessary to get the operation
going. The most essential of all, however,
was the construction of basins to house the
ships as they were being built. Unlike
conventional shipyards which constructed
ships on land and launched them into the
water, the Hooker's Point Yard built three
concrete-lined basins, 1,200 feet long, 27
feet deep and 82 feet wide, which were
connected to the Bay by huge doors. In each
basin, three of the 360-feet-long ships were
built simultaneously. Launching was simply
a matter of opening the doors and letting the
water in.14
HOUSING SHORTAGE
McCloskey's experiment with concrete ships
opened 6,000 new jobs in Tampa, and the
expansion of a third shipbuilding facility,
Tampa Marine Company, also increased the
demand for workers. Despite the high rate of
unemployment in 1940, Tampa could not
supply the labor needs of these facilities, and
company officials instituted a statewide
recruitment program. When these efforts did
not produce enough workers, the campaign
was expanded into a nationwide effort.
The campaign to attract workers was never
totally effective, and the Tampa shipyards,
as well as other industries, attempted to
offset the lack of workers by extending the
work week from 40 to 48 hours. Wages
were constantly increased, and appeals made
to operators of nonessential industries to
release workers for war industries. The cigar

industry, Tampa's largest employer prior to
World War 11, lost 2,000 skilled workers by
mid-1943, and the process of attrition
continued until the end of the conflict.15 No
doubt this loss of laborers contributed to the
decline and rapid mechanization of the cigar
industry in the postwar period.
Tampa's rise as a center of shipbuilding in
south Florida, coupled with the development
of Hillsborough County as a center for
training bomber crews, presented the city
leaders with a myriad of problems. As the
thousands of workers arrived in the city,
officials were hard-pressed to find sufficient
housing. The housing shortage became even
more critical as the military opened new
base ' s to train recruits. MacDill Field,
Drew Field and Henderson. Field were training centers for bomb crews of the Army Air
Force. Pinellas County, across the Bay from
Tampa, also attracted minor military
establishments, and added to the problem.
Despite the wartime restrictions on gasoline,
snowbirds insisted on making their annual
trek south and further complicated the
situation.16
OPA MONITORS PRICES
City leaders were hard-pressed to meet the
needs of the sudden influx of war workers.
In order to accommodate the infrastructure
needs for the expansion of the TASCO
facility and the new Hooker's Point Yard,
they asked for and received huge loans from
various government agencies. Public
transportation routes were rearranged and
new routes were added to ensure that
workers could reach the yards from almost
any point in town. Hours of operation were
expanded in order to serve the late night and
early morning shifts. Additional vehicles
were added to transport workers forced to
live as far away from the city as 50 miles.17

home owners to rent every available
apartment or room to house these new
arrivals. To ensure that workers were not
being gouged by greedy landlords, the
Office of Rent Control periodically
published lists of acceptable rents
established by federal regulations, and just
as periodically, the ORC sent inspectors into
the field to ensure that no gouging took
place.19
TRAILER FACILITIES
Despite the best efforts of the ORC and local
officials, the demand for housing exceeded
space available. A variety of plans were put
forth, including one that called for the city to
turn vacant factory buildings into
apartments. Although the plan seemed
worthwhile, it was quickly abandoned
because the cost of renovations was greater
than that of all new construction. Other
solutions had to be found.20
GEORGE M. STEINBRENNER III
…Now Owns old TASCO Yards
-Photo from HAMPTON DUNN
COLLECTION

Officials with the Tampa branch of the
Office of Price Administration closely
monitored the prices of gasoline vendors,
and were equally as diligent policing the
claims of workers in car pools for extra gas
and tire rations. Violators were charged,
prosecuted and punished. The OPA also
closely monitored the practices of local
merchants, and hoarders and speculators
were quickly dealt with.18
Perhaps the most difficult task faced by
local authorities was in satisfying the
demand for afforable housing. As the yards
expanded their labor forces, workers found
it difficult to find housing for themselves
and their families. Patriotic appeals were
frequently made in the newspapers asking

The city fathers, led by Mayor Robert E. Lee
Chancey, quickly took other steps to resolve
the problems. On the same day the Tampa
Tribune reported the decision to forego the
renovation of old factories, the City Council
voted to lease 12 acres of the Municipal
Trailer Park to serve as a park for 400 twoand three-bedroom trailers for workers and
their families. Rather primitive, the trailers
had no bathrooms or laundry facilities, and
occupants were forced to use a communal
building for this purpose. Despite the critical
shortage of housing and the relatively low
rent [$28 a month for a two-bedroom unit
and $32 for a three-bedroom one], the trailer
park proved unpopular and never operated at
full capacity.21
For workers at the new Hooker’s Point
facility,
the
Maritime
Commission
constructed 600 housing units adjacent to
the yard. The project, known as Maritime

Homes,
represented
a
considerable
improvement over the trailers. Each unit
included its own bathroom, hot water heater
and refrigerator. The project also included a
grocery store, beauty shop, barber shop and
theater. Restricted to McCloskey workers,
the rental prices were only slightly higher
than those charged for municipal trailers.22
RACE RELATIONS PLACID
Negroes in Tampa also benefitted from the
housing shortage when the city government
and the Federal Public Housing Authority
decided in 1943 to spend $2.3 million to
construct 500 low-cost concrete block
homes. Justified as a war emergency
measure to provide housing for essential
shipyard workers, the project was located
"in the heart of the largest Negro section in
Tampa, and [was] . . . well served by
electricity, water, transportation and Negro
schools." The original plans were modified
and the number of units reduced when
Tampa aldermen "asked that three of the big
apartment buildings that would have come
within 500 feet of Ponce de Leon courts, [a]
white development, be eliminated.23 Even
the desperate need for emergency housing
was not a sufficient cause to suspend the
rituals of segregation.
All in all, however, race relations in Tampa
were placid during the war. Although some
Negroes were hired in the shipyards, war
industries, with their higher wages and
strong unions, remained largely a white
preserve. A survey of the Tampa Tribune for
the years 1940-1946 reveals only one issue
that carried any mention of black shipyard
workers, and that issue pictured them sifting
through a trash pile to retrieve scrap metal
for reuse.24 The caption to the only picture
of black workers in the extant copies of the
Hooker’s Point Log, the McCloskey
company newspaper, identified the white

workers, but did not mention any of the
Negroes.25
White women, on the other hand, were
welcomed as workers. Women joined the
work force at the shipyards within a few
months of the declaration of war. Although
the initial groups of women were used in
office positions or in "soft" jobs like drafting
or driving, this quickly changed as
manpower became more scarce. Quick to
admit that “women aren't naturally
mechanically inclined," the first female
office workers nonetheless insisted that they
were 11 equally as capable as men.”26 As
the need for additional laborers became
more acute, women moved out of the offices
and into the yards.
FIRST FEMALE IN UNION
On July 28, 1942, a month after the first
Tribune article about female workers, the
newspaper ran a front page story about Mrs.
Alma Brown, the first female member of
"the ultra-conservative local No. 432 of the
Boilermakers' union, as hard-boiled an outfit
as ever pushed a ship into the sea," and the
first woman welder to join the TASCO
assembly line. Brown, the product of a
10-week welding course at a local
vocational school, entered the yard as a
probationary trainee, but her immediate
supervisor expected little difficulty in
having a woman on the job. "Sure, she'll get
along all right," he said, "She's a little bit of
a curiosity now to the boys, but when we get
five or six more the curiosity will wear
off.”27
So critical was the need for additional
workers by mid-1942, local unions, caught
between their desire to maintain control of
skilled laborers and the government's demand for more productivity, led the way in
admitting women members. Tampa Local

432 of the International Brotherhood of
Boilermakers admitted Alma Brown to
membership weeks before the national
leadership submitted the issue to a vote from
the general membership. In this way, the
62-year-old prohibition against female
members fell by the wayside, and the union
leadership found itself rushing to keep pace
with its locals.28
By 1943, women welders had become so
commonplace in both the TASCO and
Hooker’s Point yards that they received little
extra attention. By 1944, enough women
were employed in the Hooker’s Point facility
that the company could hold a yardwide
contest to select the best female welder and
sponsor her in competition with other yards
operating in the eastern United States.29
OLDER WORKERS ENLISTED
Older males found work in Tampa shipyards
as well. TASCO actively sought older men
with metalworking skills and brought them
into its yard. The oldest worker employed by
TASCO was 77 years old in 1943. J.M.
Hutchins had entered the blacksmithing
trade in 1908, had worked in the Mobile and
Pensacola shipyards during World War I and
worked at full shift at TASCO. Hutchins
was joined by others who were advanced in
age: W. M. Lovelace, 75 years old; R. F.
Roberts, 66 years old; and E. L. Broadway,
66.
The special skills these men possessed were
critical to the production of steel ships, and
they were recruited to work.
"They’re men who were doing this kind of
work before many of us were born," said
Carl Froehiking, the shop supervisor. "That
many years of experience is something that
can’t be replaced by any other kind of
training. Besides, in times like these, we

need all the men we can get to keep the iron
hot."30
A temporary subculture developed around
the yards, and company officials supported a
variety of recreational and cultural activities
for their workers. McCloskey’s Hooker’s
Point facility printed a bi-weekly newspaper,
supported various sports programs, provided
after-work social programs and generally
maintained a paternalistic attitude toward its
workers. The construction of housing
projects for war workers only tended to
promote the concept of separation from the
native population of Tampa. Although no
copies of company newspapers from the
TASCO yard have been located, references
to that yard and smaller yards in the area
indicate that a great deal of intercourse took
place between the workers of different
companies.31
"NEW SOUTH" CITY
Workers were not free to move from yard to
yard, however. Wartime job assignments,
regulated by the federal Manpower
Administration, prohibited workers from
capriciously seeking new positions. Hanging
over the head of all male workers was the
threat of losing their critical job rating and
having to enter the draft. The threat of
military service did not prevent workers
from voicing their dissatisfaction from time
to time, and all the Tampa yards experienced
work stoppages and walkouts from time to
time. Absenteeism was an early problem for
yard administrators, and remained so during
the entire war period.32
The impact of the war industries on Tampa
was revolutionary, particularly in motivating
the business and civic leadership of the city.
For them, the industrial development
brought by the war and the economic
benefits created by the construction of

military bases demonstrated the viability of
Tampa as a "New South" city.
The rapid industrialization of the Tampa
area also forced local leaders to modify their
stance on unionization and the rights of
laborers. Tampa’s reputation as a center of
antiunion feeling before the war had focused
national attention on the city, but this
sentiment was quickly suppressed when the
prospect of millions of dollars in
government contracts loomed before them.
Of course, much of the community acceptance of unions stemmed from the nature
of the shipyard work. Although TASCO was
operated by a local businessman, George B.
Howell, the Navy Department, adhering to
the pro-labor legislation of the New Deal,
mandated the use of union labor. Howell and
other local leaders had no choice but to
accept this mandate. Hooker’s Point Yard,
owned by northerner McCloskey, also
depended on government contracts, and
local sentiment played no part in its decision
to recognize the right of unions. The
conversion of prominent Floridians to the
labor point of view was temporary at best,
and the state adopted a "right to work" constitutional amendment in 1944.33
The influx of nearly 31,000 new workers
and their families dramatically altered the
economy of the city, and changed it from a
sonambulent semi-rural city with a primarily
agricultural and semiskilled labor base into
an aggressive forward-looking city seeking
to retain and expand its wartime supply of
skilled labor. As early as February 1942,
Tampa newspapers were speculating as to
what Tampa’s future would be after the war.
By 1943, corporate leaders at TASCO,
Hooker’s Point and the smaller yards in the
area were focusing a portion of their time
and resources on postwar industrial pursuits.

George B. Howell and the TASCO yard
management team inaugurated a program to
design, build and test semitrailers for use by
trucking companies in the postwar period.
Matt McCloskey, the owner of the Hooker’s
Point Yard, also invested time, money and
manpower in identifying and developing
postwar products. Civic leaders promoted
the concept of a new industrially-based
economy for the postwar years, and the
diversity of these ideas indicated that most
Tampans were no longer willing to return to
the prewar reliance on tourism, cigars and
agriculture. They wanted more.34
The productive capacity and engineering
innovations of Tampa yards gave every
indication that the possibility of maintaining
a postwar heavy industry base was very real.
Matt McCloskey’s Hooker’s Point Yard
astonished the shipbuilding world by
devising new construction techniques in its
use of reinforced concrete to build cargo
vessels.
SECONDARY INDUSTRY
Although some concrete ships had been built
during World War 1, these ships had proved
to be fragile and unreliable. Hooker’s Point
Yard, using continuous pours made possible
by new vacuum pumps and mobile mixers
mounted on trucks, applied many of the
techniques used in constructing high-rise
buildings. When engineers determined that a
lighter weight concrete was needed,
McCloskey employees identified "Fuller’s
earth" as a substitute for the heavier sand
traditionally used. A secondary industry
developed around the mining of this
material, and the McCloskey company
purchased deposits and opened their own
mining operation.35
Concrete ships built by the Hooker’s Point
Yard provided a viable alternative to steel
ships, and when the nation’s steel output

failed to keep pace with demands during the
early years of the war, these ships helped
meet the need for new vessels. Unlike their
World War I counterparts, the McCloskey
ships performed very well. Powered by
3,500 h.p. reciprocal engines, the "floating
skyscrapers"
weathered
hurricanes,
submarine attacks and hard use. Individuals
who served on the concrete ships were most
complimentary of their stability, durability
and overall seaworthiness. McCloskey’s
continued development of this method of
shipbuilding was brought to an end when
supplies of steel improved.
Although revolutionary in design and
relatively inexpensive to produce, the major
criticism of the concrete vessels was the
length of time needed to produce them. In an
era when Henry J. Kaiser was producing a
550-foot "Victory" ship every ten days, the
three to six weeks needed to produce the
smaller concrete ship could not be justified.
Although
some
experiments
were
undertaken to speed up the "curing" time for
the wet concrete, no significant reduction
was ever achieved. No longer concerned
about materiel shortages, the Maritime
Commission ended the concrete ship
experiment, and in 1944, the Hooker’s Point
facility joined the rest of the nation’s yards
and began to construct steel ships of the
N-3, coastal cargo freighter variety.36
TASCO STAYS LEADER
Tampa Marine Company, another yard
along the Ybor Channel of Tampa Bay, also
contributed to the city’s war economy.
Employing only 200 prewar workers, this
yard expanded its capacity significantly
during the war years, and between 1942 and
1945, it produced 95 oceangoing tugs.
Bushnell-Lyons, another small company,
produced steel barges for the Navy. Perhaps
the most noteworthy accomplishments of

these yards came from the diversity of ships
that were produced.37
Despite the productivity of Hooker’s Point,
Tampa
Marine
Company
and
Bushnell-Lyons, the combination of these
yards could not match the productivity of
the TASCO yard. Operated under contract to
the Navy, TASCO produced an amazing
variety of naval vessels, ranging from the
10,000 ton destroyer tenders, Piedmont,
Sierra, and Yosemite, to seven ammunition
carriers in the Mazama and Mauna Loa
class. In addition to these large supply ships,
TASCO also produced 24 coastal
minesweepers in the Auk and Admirable
classes, 12 destroyer escorts, as well as a
number of self-contained "barracks" barges,
repair vessels and cargo ships.
Including repairs made to ships damaged by
enemy vessels and conversions made to
existing ships, TASCO processed a total of
494 vessels. Its employees received approximately $105 million in wages and salaries,
most of which remained in the Tampa
economy. In addition, the company either
trained or paid for the training of a large
number of Tampa residents in the skilled
machine trades.38 The full extent of the
yard’s production was a closely guarded
secret during the war, and Navy personnel
maintained a close watch over the facility.
The Tampa Tribune made note of the
secrecy imposed by the Navy when it
announced on July 1, 1945: "Navy Takes
Lid Off Tampa Shipyards.”39

END COMES SUDDENLY
The economic boom created by the entry of
the U.S. into World War 11 ended suddenly
for Tampans. With the Allied victory in
Europe in April, 1945, and the detonation of
the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and

Nagasaki on August 6 and 7, the need for
more ships suddenly ceased. By August 12,
despite the absence of a formal surrender by
Japan, both the Navy and Maritime
Commission cut back their orders for ships.
Two days later, TASCO announced a
reduction of its labor force by 2,000
workers. On August 17, McCloskey’s
Hooker’s Point Yard announced the loss of
its contracts. In rapid succession, the Tampa
Tribune announced one layoff after another.
The phaseout was not a gradual process, and
layoffs were frequently for thousands of
workers at a time.40
By December, 1945, the Hooker’s Point
Yard was closed permanently, and little
war-related activity was going on at TASCO
or Tampa Marine. Both companies had
returned to peacetime production, and the
strategic planning for the postwar period
allowed them to continue operations,
although at a reduced level.

attacks on organized labor. Within days of
the beginning of layoffs by Tampa
shipyards, he announced his intention to
enforce the "right to work" amendment to
the state’s constitution.42
There is little in Tampa today to remind
residents of the great flurry of activity that
was generated by the World War II
shipyards. Hooker’s Point is gone, replaced
by other industries. Maritime Homes, the
large complex erected for war workers, has
been bulldozed. TASCO has passed through
several hands and now is known as the
American Shipbuilding Company, a
property of New York Yankees owner,
George Steinbrenner. It is as if some giant
hand has simply wiped the slate clean, and
what was isn’t and never will be again.43

George B. Howell, the dominant force
behind TASCO, resigned the presidency of
the company and returned to the banking
business. Matt McCloskey, the developer of
Hooker’s Point, now shifted his attention
once again to traditional construction
enterprises, although he did purchase an
interest in a Jacksonville shipbuilding
company. For the residents of Tampa, the
end of the war did not mean an end to the
industrial dreams spurred by the war. For the
next 20 years, various attempts would be
made to keep Tampa shipyards in operation.
The irony is that the Japanese, whose defeat
was engineered in part by Tampa workers,
would now prove to be too strong as
competitors for this industry.41

Despite the demise of Tampa’s shipyards,
there are some who remember this great
adventure fondly. There are also occasional
flashes from the past when ship names are
mentioned. Perhaps the greatest tribute to
the strength and vitality of the shipyards is
found in a perusal of Jane’s Fighting Ships
or other ship publications. Here and there,
the notations appear: "built by Tampa
Shipbuilding." For most of the ships
constructed between 1940 to 1946, age and
modernity have consigned them to
scrapheaps or reserve fleets, but some, like
the Sierra and Yosemite, still play an active
role in today’s Navy. For still others,
however, postwar existence has meant being
transferred to foreign countries. Today,
Tampa-built ships are operated by the navies
of Taiwan, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Argentina
and Turkey. Orphans of the sea, but still
they sail.44
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